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The Impact of Psychological-Cultural
Factors on Concepts of Fighting
Terrorism
Sybille Reinke de Buitrago

Introduction
The aim of this paper is to show how counterterrorism measures and policy are shaped by the national frame of reference of a country, here in
particular the United States. This insight is important not only in the
interpretation of political developments but also in the formulation of
policy responding to these developments. A better awareness of the influence of the American national reference frame can aid policy makers to
formulate effective and constructive policy.
The national reference frame is made up of factors such as the national
identity, the national self-image und self-understanding as well as patterns of threat perception. Since these factors are distinct among countries, differences in interpretation and policy result.1 Not knowing, at a
deeper level, how these factors act on policy making, frame and even limit
interpretation and perceived potential for action can greatly hinder constructive policy making. Potentially resulting inappropriate policies can
then lead to the escalation of conflicts and further limit options for action
and for building peaceful relations.
The analysis of this article rests on the results of qualitative content analysis and interviews. The theoretical framework is social constructivism
with a critical element. The article is structured as follows:
Counterterrorism measures and the impact of a national reference frame
and of culture are elaborated on in a general sense. The theoretical and
methodological frameworks are laid out. Then the focus is placed on the
approach and particular national reference frame of the United States.
The implications of the American approach with both the learning of the
past years and the constraints provided by the national reference frame
are assessed. Finally, opportunities for increasing both effectiveness and
peace potential in future action are shown.

59

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 1

Journal of Strategic Security

Counterterrorism Measures and the National
Reference Frame
The measures to deal with or fight international terrorism have evolved
since 9/11. This is due to a number of factors. For one, thinking more in
depth about the phenomenon of international terrorism and being forced
to deal with it more have led to a greater understanding of involved
dynamics, actors and motivations. The engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq
and other places has also contributed to a better understanding.
Increased contact with locals has illuminated culturally-specific factors
and relevant conditions on the ground.
These measures build on one another as well. On the one side, the new
structures and institutions, the great resources invested and personnel
employed and the gained knowledge constitute the evolution of counterterrorism measures. On the other side, these investments can take on a life
of their own. As additional resources are channeled into new institutions,
new jobs created and linkages built, there are interests being vested. A
large establishment is tasked with securing a country. The personnel,
resources, institutions and agencies and their linkages all keep this
machinery rolling, continually building on one another and thereby also
expanding. One might thus warn against the developments of dynamics
that take counterterrorism measures beyond the justifiable.
Western states face an innovative and global adversary, which is not easily
discerned. The motivating ideology has a great impact. It is therefore
important to understand the dynamics of radicalization of these actors
(Ranstorp and Herd 2007, 3, 6-7). Counterterrorism efforts have to
include an appropriate ideological response that aims to reduce terrorist
support (Gunaratna 2007, 21).
Countries have had different experiences with terrorism, contributing to
their view of it also being different. While for Western European countries, it was mostly a domestic issue (Rees 2006, 56–57), the U.S. experienced terrorism mostly as an external threat and therefore has its distinct
view.
In this article I argue that a strong influence on policy making is the
national reference frame of a state. In the interpretation of political developments, of other actors and threats, the national reference frame acts to
shape thinking. Not only interpretation is shaped by the national reference frame, but also policy formulation.
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Factors that make up such a national reference system are many and
diverse, among them being national identity, the national self-view and
perceived role of one's state in the world as well as political culture. But
also the views held about others are included, as self-view and the views
about others are formed in interaction. National myths and historical
experiences are also part of this frame. Even interests, insofar as they
have become politically institutionalized, can be a part. These factors
interact, being mutually constitutive. Together they act as a frame in
which perception processes, interpretation and policy making are (seen
as) possible. They enable certain views and actions, while limiting, disabling or preventing others. In essence, the national reference frame is a
state's psychological foundation.
A national frame of reference can also be expanded to allow for the inclusion of other or new views. However, such changes likely take place in the
longer term. For change to occur, some sort of impetus is needed—perhaps a crisis that forces new interpretations onto policy makers or other
strong pressures. Mostly, however, a state's national reference system will
maintain its core elements and arguments, as these build on one another
and are thereby continually confirmed.

Cultural Impact on Counterterrorism Measures
The counterterrorism measures are influenced and shaped by the
national frame of reference of a country. To further explain this influence,
a brief elaboration of the impact of culture, socialization and perception is
helpful.
In our perception and interpretation of the world we are influenced by our
culture, and this often in an unconscious manner. Culture acts as a strong
force upon a group and its members. It is a way of seeing, thinking about
and relating to the world around, including other humans. It concerns the
behavior of humans, their values and beliefs and how they arrive at them.
Clyde Kluckhohn defined culture as:
Patterned ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting, acquired and
transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in
artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e.
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their
attached values (1951, 86).
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More currently, Glen Fisher offers his definition of culture as structure,
knowledge and coping skills system, all of it socially created, tested and
transmitted. It is learned and shared (1997, 44).
During the process of human socialization, humans learn ideas about the
world and about others. This is done via language, phrases and undertones in the speech heard in one's environment, including mass media.
Also school books with their portrayals of history and other individual
factors, such as education, social status, gender and political position
shape our ideas about others (Flohr 1991, 78–84, 87, 90–99) and about
ourselves.
It is what humans learn as familiar that allows them to differentiate
things that are external and different. Individuals become group members
and share the view of what is familiar and internal and of what is different. Shared aspects are further invested in and strengthened (Volkan
1994, 38, 41).
Culture's strong impact is also due to values being learned so early on in a
child's socialization that it is not possible to first cognitively deal with
them. Interaction with others in one's group serves to integrate values
and expectations in an individual, which then impact perception and
interpretation. The individual becomes bound to the own group
(Spillmann and Spillmann 1989, 16–17).
An important part in socialization is the forming of identity. "Identity is
defined as an abiding sense of the self and of the relationship of the self to
the world. It is a system of beliefs or a way of construing the world that
makes life predictable rather than random." (Northrup 1989, 55) In
groups, identity is shared to a degree. Even a national identity is enabled.
While national identities encompass many people, certain values and
beliefs are still shared.
Identity and perception patterns impact one another. Perception is
defined as "the type of information processing…essential to all living
beings as needed orientation guide in order to survive in their respective
environment" (Spillmann and Spillmann, 4, translated by author). As
humans form their identity in their own emotional and cognitive learning
processes, they form distinct perception patterns, which are shared in
groups (ibid, 12).
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People perceive and react mostly based on their views and images of a situation or of facts. In these processes emotions or a sense of purpose can
also play a significant role (Fisher, 4, 5, 27). Perception is dependent on
the interpretation of reality as reality (Ostermann and Nicklas 1976, 22).
Since among group members perception patterns are shared, they also
see the world and reduce the world's complexity along similar lines. Cognitive systems of humans and patterns of perception and interpretation
are relatively stable once formed. The reduction of complexity serves to
meet basic physical and social needs. Simply put, we see what we expect
to see (Fisher, 23–25).
But humans also construct national identities, and such dynamics then
apply to states as well. Also national identity is biased (Kowert 1998, 109).
A state's identity "is a subjective assessment of the defining characteristics
of the state, one's affective attachment to the state, and legitimate policies
that must be pursued by the state." Individuals construct the subjective
identities for their own state and for other states (Rousseau, Miodownik
and Lux Petrone 2001, 6).
The sense of nationality is formed early on and strengthened by later
interaction. The own nation is emphasized and a view of other nations is
learned. These national images impact interstate relations. National
images include levels of friendliness or hostility and a certain power
potential (Boulding 1996, 461–464), along with ideas of security or insecurity. Images, also those of nations, reduce complexity (Boulding 1956,
111–112).
In the perception of something, the way of presentation and context is
important (Fisher, 29). Framing an issue in a certain manner impacts
perception and interpretation, for example via connotations or undertones, by presenting a certain context or connecting an issue with certain
metaphors or to past events.
Meaning is made via framing. Interpretations and definitions express a
position towards or belief about something. They include an appeal and
can be used to convince others and to build legitimacy. Effective framing
employs vocabulary that resonates with the intended audience and that is
part of its history. Framing of a situation can be used to promote a certain
response. A situation is defined in a manner so that a certain response in
the group's cultural memory fits, linking situation to response. As example, in the U.S. 9/11 was linked with Pearl Harbor and placed in a war
frame, facilitating war as response (Brock et al. 2005, 82–83).
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Leaders also often use metaphors. Such metaphors are culture-specific,
making sense to the listeners of that culture (Heisey 1997, 15). Metaphors
shape views and call upon people to act (Schäffner 2002, 183). Also,
national myths are important. They provide meaning by offering an identity, a shared vision and a course of action. They express and strengthen
values (Kluver 1997, 55–58).
Framing can be done in more or less subtle ways, but it must not necessarily be conscious. Due to socialization, framing can also occur while
being unaware of it, which explains the strength of a reference frame of an
individual or of a nation in shaping views and action.
But it is important to distinguish framing from a national reference
frame. Within the latter the former can take place. The manner of framing
is influenced by the national reference frame. This reference frame is,
however, more encompassing. It impacts how information is processed,
shaping perception and interpretation of the world around, of events and
other actors, all on a national level. It acts as a frame in which thinking
and therefore action is possible.

Analysis
This section briefly lays out the theoretical framework and methodology
applied. The analysis covers the period from 9/11 until today. This
includes the first and second Bush administrations. While this period is
limited to these two administrations as a particular presidency and political style, there are also factors that go well beyond. These factors, to be
detailed later, are rooted deep within American culture and the international behavior of the U.S. Furthermore, certain policies received different weights from the first to the second term due to internal and external
developments.
The theoretical framework is social constructivism of Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann with a critical view. Social reality is produced—in different versions—via social interaction and different categorizations,
which humans use to interpret and understand the world around (Berger
und Luckmann 1967, 70, 85; Pörksen 2000, 24, 27; Ulbert 2005, 9–13;
Ulbert 2003, 392). Humans are actors and their socialization shapes their
reference frames on individual and group levels. In these processes, language is a significant factor in the interpretation and political legitimacybuilding (Risse 2003, 101).
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The added critical element consists of the consideration of the role of the
observer or the researcher. Viewing social reality as constructed also has
epistemological consequences. The researcher is seen to also construct
(Ulbert 2003, 392; Weller 2003/2004, 109, 113), which presents
researchers with the dilemma of how to make valid interpretations and
conclusions. Not only need possible own constructions be reflected upon
and subjectivity of the research process acknowledged, also methodological tools must be used to limit these. Another possible solution can be
seen in taking peace as a norm to strive for. Added is the view that certain
interpretations and perceptions are restrictive and limit options for political action. From this follows that reinterpretations of views and policy can
open paths for dialogue and more peaceful relations.
Furthermore, the theoretical approach used here assumes more than just
a subjective reality construction, but rather an intersubjective one. The
critical or reflective elements allow the researcher also to reflect on his or
her own constructions. To still further enable objectivity, methodological
tools are used, including the utilization of background information, triangulation, transparency of the research process, systematic steps and
explicit rules, which allow the traceability of results.
As to the methodology, a qualitative content analysis of strategy documents and speeches, interviews and a literature review are integrated.
The insights from the content analysis are completed with those from the
interviews, held with a number of decision makers and experts in security
policy in the U.S. from key institutions in security policy and counterterrorism.2

United States
The American response to terrorism and its continued efforts against it
are heavily shaped by the application of hard-power tools. Feeling
attacked on 9/11 contributed to a framing of the situation as one of war,
which led to seeing war as response. Since then, however, debate on
which tools might prove most effective has very much increased. This
debate is also due to the learning of past years.
To the U.S., 9/11 was "an insult to American honor" (Howard 2002, 9)
and perhaps facilitated a call for war and revenge. But calling it a war
leads to a type of war psychosis, actions, demands and expectations (ibid,
9, 10). This move towards the war frame, of seeing terrorism as a new
form of warfare has been starting in the mid-1990s already. The danger of
terrorism was seen to be growing and this increase was met with greater
action (Alexander 2006, 15, 16).
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On the one side, this war frame of reference shapes thinking and action.
But the war frame also fits in the particular national reference frame of
the U.S. The American identity—strongly influenced by the historical formation of America—favors individualism, optimism and problem-solving.
This enables a view that America and Americans can defeat terrorism and
even do so alone. A need for cooperation or for compromise with partners
gains little traction in such a view, and if then not for the sake of cooperation but due to a realization that success is otherwise not possible.
Linked to the war framing of 9/11, George W. Bush approached the threat
of terrorism in a black-white and almost theological manner. This aids
mobilization, but neglects the complexity of the issues. Different threats
and challenges are lumped together along with unfinished business in
Iraq. It would be better to deal with the complexities (Brzezinski 2005,
16–17, 19) and to recognize the differences among actors (Kilcullen 2005,
601). Weaknesses in the American approach are also presented by ignoring how own actions impact the situation at hand and by overestimating
the force of their own values and underestimating the force of extremist
ideas (Ranstorp and Herd, 12–13).
On the one side, there is recognition by American policy makers that the
world and indeed many issues have become more complex. On the other
side, however, the optimism inherent in the American culture and political style could also lead to a view that the U.S. can still deal with complex
issues even if there is not a deep understanding of them. The optimism
and problem-solving orientation could act to limit an in-depth inquiry
and instead favor an attitude of 'getting to the problem' right away. In
addition, the oversimplification of issues and actors is likely to partly stem
from the sense about the own nation, a nation that is so vast in size as well
as powerful. Placing the own nation into the center of the world limits
perceived needs to learn about other nations in a detailed and differentiated manner.
The analysis of strategy documents and the interviews show that today's
threats are seen as global and stemming from distance places. Terrorism,
along with weak or failed states, WMD in the hands of terrorists or dictators, terrorist safe havens and support and spreading regional conflicts, is
seen as unable to be countered by traditional deterrence. The view that
distance no longer provides security aids an expansive counterterrorism
and defense policy.
The threat of international terrorism is called imminent and real. Further
and more deadly terrorist attacks are said to occur as long as there are
global terrorist groups. The likelihood of terrorists using WMD is also
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said to have increased, again aiding a more aggressive, forward policy.
Such a perception of threats and their context is helped somewhat by the
oversimplification of issues already mentioned and the optimistic belief
that America can defeat the threats. The use of force to counter terrorist
violence is also aided by the historical experience and the national myths
of America. The U.S. has in the past responded with military might to
external challenges and won with that approach. After the Cold War, to a
great extent also a military competition, it was the only superpower left.
This strengthened a view of military power being appropriate to deal with
conflicts.
The national reference frame with its elements of oversimplification of
issues and a certain tendency to use dichotomies shapes perception and
interpretation of actors as well. Terrorists are thus seen not only as mobile
and elusive. They are also described as ruthless, uncivilized, deceiving,
murderous, evil and as enemies of freedom. Terrorists are said to not go
by rules of war, attacking soft targets and preying on vulnerable governments and individuals and on ungoverned spaces. They aim for WMD for
still deadlier attacks.
Language to describe or speak about the terrorist enemy includes the use
of opposites to show how different the enemy is from the self. Furthermore, the terrorists are described in terms of their character traits and
thus are to be discredited at a deeper level. The feeling of being under
attack may create more fear, and emotional dimensions are used to justify
counterterrorism measures.
Viewing the battle as not just one of arms but also one of ideas facilitates
American efforts for democracy promotion. Such efforts are now part of
the counterterrorism measures of the U.S.
In the efforts to fight the evil of terrorism, America is guided by its sense
of mission to defend freedom for Americans and the world. Freedom, justice, peace and human dignity are understood as being true for all
humans.
The felt obligation to fight that which is evil by America as a free nation
acts as a strong motivator for American policy. It is combined with the
optimism that such a fight can and must be won, along with the view that
God is on America's side, a sense of mission and American exceptionalism.
Policy implications also come from the view that the terrorist attacks of
9/11 were unprecedented in magnitude and direction. Seeing 9/11 as an
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act of war against the U.S., the civilized world and human freedom can
partly explain the measures taken. 9/11 showed that America is vulnerable, something that did not fit the element of felt invincibility in the
national reference frame. Thus, 9/11 is said to have led to a new era with
the U.S. fighting a global war against terrorism with new tools.
When American policy makers see the price of indifference as catastrophic due to the fact that WMD can be involved in an attack, then the
prevention and indeed pre-emption of terrorist acts gains importance of
first order (even if prevention and pre-emption are not always clearly differentiated). Due to suicide attacks and new technology available, preemption has become a valid tool for some American policy makers. The
question of how a terrorist who is bent on committing an attack with
WMD is to be prevented is not satisfactorily answered, however, as military force cannot prevent or pre-empt all attempts.
The American approach is shaped by the factors such as the specific
American historical experience, national identity, military and other
power potential, its overpowering international position and perhaps
even the role of religion in politics expressed in the sense of mission.
Some of the measures against terrorism are quite detailed and specific,
showing that there has been much thinking about it. Measures are extensive and cover many different institutions, actors and societal areas. Of
course, also a great amount of resources has been invested in counterterrorism. A potential problem is that the institutions, actors and resources
tasked with fighting terrorism may take on a life of their own—all being
active and engaged in trying to foresee and prevent threats. Threats could
become exaggerated to justify the spending of resources, while such an
exaggeration of threats can take place in an unconscious or conscious
manner. The particular national reference frame acts to increase such
effects and strengthen the dynamics behind.

Implications
Below follows a brief assessment of the approach. The learning of the past
years is illustrated as well as the constraints provided by the national reference frame. The potential for greater effectiveness and peace is pointed
to.
The American approach is heavily shaped by the use of hard power and
unilateral action. The view of the U.S. being endowed with a mission to
lead the world and the stronger tendency for dichotomies in perception
and interpretation act to limit attempts to seek cooperation for greater
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legitimacy. In addition, emotionally charged descriptions of opponents
are frequently used. But these restrict understanding, interpretation and
therefore policy potential. Along with it they have a long-term effect, not
only on the opponents, but also on the own perception and behavior.
The ability to act alone is connected with the view of the U.S. having a
mission and with a tendency for black-white thinking. These factors combine with a strong impact on the American approach. They favor and
enable unilateral action without seeking consensus or cooperation. The
view that the U.S. does not need consensus or cooperation in its international behavior lets the U.S. at times engage in missions that on the one
side are beyond its own reach and that on the other side lead to more or
less strong disagreement and counteraction. In addition, new conflicts
can be created or existing ones escalated.
These effects ultimately reduce American effectiveness and influence.
Describing the opponent or enemy in an emotionally charged manner
may help mobilization of support within the U.S., but it also leads to the
persistence of oversimplified views and issues. Not recognizing the differences and complexities of developments and actors, such as the differences among terrorist groups reduces the effectiveness of American
counterterrorism measures.

Learning
Since 9/11 there also has been some learning. Yet, the reference frame
shapes how much learning is possible. Overall, there has been a differentiation and deepening of the understanding of the threat of terrorism and
terrorists. Terrorism is generally not seen as monolithic anymore. The
view of terrorism not being monolithic shows a certain ability to see terrorism in a more nuanced manner and terrorist groups as different. A
more differentiated view allows the conception and application of varied
approaches to different groups. Linked is the idea of disaggregation,
which expresses the cognitive, perceptive ability to increasingly differentiate groups and therefore enables different treatment of them.
While there is still a strong emotionalization of issues, there are also calls
for approaching the threat of terrorism in a more level-headed and
unemotional manner, especially by some policy experts and members of
the military.
Among the learning is also that non-military or civil means are important
and must be applied for effective counterterrorism. The emphasis on
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hard-power tools is thus beginning to be balanced somewhat by the application of soft-power tools. In the area of soft power, the European allies
are seen as forerunners, from which the Americans can learn something.
Another lesson is the need to deal with the ideology of terrorists and
extremists. The ideological messages of radicals have to be met with messages by moderates, in order to make terrorists illegitimate in the eyes of
their host population, to limit further recruitment and to withdraw some
of the motivations and support, which would ultimately weaken terrorists. This means that the elements of extremists' messages must be made
transparent, along with the political motivations behind. In addition
though, alternative messages are needed. The interpretations of issues
offered by extremists and terrorists must be balanced with alternative,
moderate interpretations.
Part of American counterterrorism measures is the continued engagement in Iraq. But the invasion of Iraq has created constraints for policy
action. Also other motives were driving the decision to invade Iraq, while
debate on it was lacking. Stabilizing the country now is a great and probably long-term challenge. Thus, in the future it is important to clearly lay
out the strategic aims and motivations for actions and carefully consider
the consequences. Furthermore, intelligence ought not to be politicized as
it was done in the lead-up to the Iraq War so that effectiveness of measures is not hampered from the get-go.
The view that tools other than military ones are also needed to fight terrorism has been part of the learning. Civil tools must be multiplied so that
terrorism can be fought more comprehensively. A continued and still
increased debate over civil tools is important, as well as addressing some
of the root causes that are exploited by terrorists.
Multiplying and expanding partnerships with allies as well as non-allies
was also seen as important. The recognition that the U.S. cannot be effective in counterterrorism when acting alone has been growing. This recognition includes the view that the U.S. needs to compromise more with
partners and that it can learn from them.
Finally, learning includes the greater need to understand the enemy. Such
a seen need not only expresses the search for ways to defeat the enemy,
but also a certain interest in the opponent or enemy. This interest can be
seen as something positive, as it implies a willingness to cognitively deal
with the other.
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National Reference Frame as Constraint
However, while there has been learning in the past few years in how to
make counterterrorism more effective, there are also constraints that
limit learning. The national reference frame of the U.S. is such a limitation. As stated, the national reference frame of a country is a strong force
that shapes perception, interpretation and therefore also policy making.
While some of these constraints were already mentioned, a few of the
strongest will be laid out in greater detail. For one, the tendency to use
dichotomies and opposites, as in humanity and freedom versus terror and
tyranny is typical for American political discourse and perhaps even more
so in the area of foreign and defense policy. Such a tendency limits learning about the other and gaining a deeper understanding. Perception is
simplified and narrowed, which then also restrict further options for
action. An additional effect is a growing isolation from the groups that are
seen as the enemy. Such isolation would hinder a rapprochement or dialogue. The created divisions are hard to overcome later.
The use of dichotomies also adds to the emotionalization of issues and
actors. Emotionally charged descriptions serve to legitimize certain views,
but the created fear has negative effects. The view of the other is limited,
again constraining the view of possible action. Emotional language also
stigmatizes the other, which again creates difficulties for later rapprochement.
The American ability to compromise and partnerships are limited by its
drive and motivation for unilateral action and its sense of mission. Feeling
motivated by a mission, perceiving an obligation from a higher power to
lead and being able to act alone due to own power combine for a strong
discouragement of any recognition to have to compromise with partners.
Continually repeating in policy-making circles and confronting the public
with the statement that America is not yet safe has its own problems. For
one it begs the questions of when the U.S. would be safe and who gets to
decide when that is so, or more fundamentally, could it ever be safe.
Linked to a desire to be safe is the feeling of invulnerability that existed
until 9/11. Likely, there is a longing for its return. Overall though, the
problem of a potentially constant state of fear is compounded by a potentially endless mobilization and military engagement.
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Effectiveness and Peace Potential
The learning opens some opportunities both for greater effectiveness of
measures and for peace. The greater recognition of a need for a more differentiated view of issues and actors as well as the already existing grown
understanding of them allows a differentiation in the approach of different terrorist groups. If the U.S. can actually begin to approach and work
with some of them—for example, those that participate in terrorism out of
a need to ensure a living, those that are forced to take part or those that
act out of a drive to maintain their own independence—it can reduce
motivations, some recruitment and therefore terrorism overall. Cooperation can occur by bringing some of the more legitimate grievances into a
political, non-violent process.
The potential for peace is also increased by the view that the ideas and
ideology motivating terrorism must also be dealt with. This is linked to
the greater understanding of the enemy. The ideas and ideology are an
important motivation for terrorist action, recruitment and support.
Showing what these ideas are in detail and uncovering their motivations,
which often simply aim at power and domination over own populations,
can help to reduce their influence. Credibly showing that terrorists are
often only interested in power and using their host populations instead of
protecting and helping them as they claim can reduce overall support for
such groups. Also alternative, moderate ideas are needed. These alternative ideas need to supplant the radical and violent ones for a long-term,
de-escalatory effect.
Many facets of terrorism, such as the ideology of it, cannot be fought or
countered with military means. Thus, the learning that civil means are
much more needed for effectiveness and legitimacy of actions also provides potential for peace and de-escalation. Conflicts cannot be solved by
military tools alone. The affected populations must be shown that the U.S.
is not their enemy. A country usually needs to be rebuilt long-term so that
the population has a means of surviving and to continue living. The perception that the foreign military powers are there to help is very important and this perception is strengthened by the use of civil means.
Within American policy circles, the view of needing partners to be effective has grown. More and stronger partnerships and compromises would
limit unilateral action by the U.S. and give cooperative action more legitimacy. America could be more effective in the long term by acting with
others. Doing so would allow it to maintain its own legitimacy and good
standing and strengthen its partnerships and thereby impact. Wielding its
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great power in a more multilateral and consensus-based fashion would
more effectively bring or strengthen peace.

Opportunities
Since 9/11, the U.S. has expanded its counterterrorism measures and
gained a greater understanding of issues, threats and actors. American
decision makers are increasingly recognizing that the U.S. needs others to
deal with terrorism and that more civil tools must be applied for longterm results.
The learning that has taken place among American policy makers, despite
the limits placed upon it by the national reference frame, also brings
opportunities for future action. These opportunities are about learning
from partners and finding the best elements of the different approaches.
The goal is to become not only more effective in counterterrorism efforts
but also to expand the peace-building potential of these efforts.
In cooperation and coordination among partners, more effective missions
require a deeper awareness about existing differences. On the one side,
there must be an awareness of divergent views and goals in shared missions. On the other side, there is a need for more and open dialogue about
these differences. To find compromises for all sides and agree on a shared
course of action is significant in more than one way. For one, effectiveness
of action is increased. Another result is that an open debate provides a
check on the specific elements of a particular mission as well as a chance
to evaluate the potential for backfiring. The creation of new problems
while trying to solve others must be avoided.
Partners can also learn from each other. The U.S. can learn from its partners how to approach the threat of terrorism in a more level-headed manner. Rational calculations are more useful than emotionalized language
when assessing the threat. This would also be helpful in not unnecessarily
increasing fear. Linked is a greater knowledge in terms of cultural, historical and political aspects of Islamic countries or other countries in general. A better understanding, awareness of and interest in global issues
also enables more appropriate policy making.
There is also the idea that the counterterrorism machinery in the U.S.
might have evolved more than needed and developed some kind of life of
its own. American political institutions need to balance off any self-created impetus for threat exaggeration and over-engagement.
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Another area where the U.S. can learn is in the use of civil means for stabilization and conflict resolution. This concerns the types of civil means
that are currently available and which ones might be most effective in
which situation, but also their greater development and creation of new
ones. The view that the ideas feeding terrorism can hardly be fought by
military means is finding more followers on the American side, but the
U.S. can learn much more here.
Also in the upholding of own values and pursuing policy in a transparent
and credible manner, American policy makers have significantly to learn.
Rhetoric of democracy, freedom, human dignity and the rule of law must
also be mirrored in action if the U.S. wants to be taken serious and seen as
legitimate. Doing so would increase American effectiveness again.
Other countries can learn from the U.S. that the need for consensus-seeking has to be balanced with the need for action. At times, only calling for
dialogue will not solve the problem, especially with an actor that is unwilling to cooperate. This is not to say that military force must be used. But
dialogue and measures of engagement must be more fruitfully balanced
with more active and at times forceful measures. While the American
overemphasis on military means is problematic, so is a call for dialogue
without anything to back it up. The right mix is of course an art.
Different partners have different elements that are more effective in fighting terrorism. Learning from each other and combining these elements as
best practices would make counterterrorism efforts more effective in both
the short and long term. Achieving sustainable results is after all an essential goal, while the creation of new problems is to be avoided.
Increasing legitimacy of counterterrorism is important for effectiveness.
The efforts have to be more transparent. Engagement and the principles
that the U.S. and its partners champion must be more credible in the eyes
of those that could become supporters of terrorism. Reducing the base on
which terrorism stands can only come via credibility and legitimacy. Such
engagement can sustainably minimize the support—material and ideological—that terrorist groups draw from.

Conclusion
This article has argued that the national reference frame of a country acts
to strongly influence not only perception and interpretation of events and
actors, but also the resulting policy. The American national reference
frame served as an example in the analysis. Part of the paper was also the
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learning of American policy makers in the area of counterterrorism in the
last few years. This learning is again influenced by the respective frame.
The national reference frame impacts thinking and policy, but it is not an
insurmountable obstacle. Policy makers can and must become more
aware of this influence. Especially when it takes the form of a limitation,
awareness can help to widen the understanding and interpretation.
Other, more appropriate policies or additional elements within a policy
can be enabled again. The U.S. can also learn from its partners. The combination of elements and best practices of each can contribute to de-escalation, to increasing the peace potential of actions and to overall becoming
more effective in counterterrorism.
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Endnotes
1 This article developed from a conference paper, where the American approach to
counterterrorism was compared with the German one. The different national reference frames of both countries, as the analysis showed, can partly explain the different policies. A previous analysis of the American and German approach to and
communication about current threats, especially terrorism, also found important
differences (Reinke de Buitrago 2008).
2 Interviewees are kept anonymous. Interviews were held with individuals of
Congress, Department of State, Department of Defense and think tanks.
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